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There is growing consensus that the conduct of monetary policy can have an impact on 
financial and economic stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks. Falling interest 
rates might induce a “search for yield” and generate incentives to invest into risky activities. 
This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and commercial property 
prices and the risk-taking incentives of banks. We use a factor-augmented vector 
autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the U.S. for the years 1997-2008. We include standard 
macroeconomic indicators and factors summarizing information provided in the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. These data allow modeling the reactions of 
banks’ new lending volumes and the riskiness of new loans. We do not find evidence for a 
risk-taking channel for the entire banking system after a monetary policy loosening or an 
unexpected increase in property prices. This masks, however, important differences across 
banking groups. Small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk, foreign banks lower 
risk, and large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. 
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1  Motivation 
There is growing consensus that the conduct of monetary policy can have an impact on 
financial and economic stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks (Rajan 2005, 
Borio and Zhu 2008). Falling interest rates might induce a “search for yield” and 
generate incentives to invest into risky activities such as in the years preceding the global 
financial crisis. This can have implications for optimal central bank policy which may 
want to take into consideration aspects of financial stability (see, e.g., Stein 2010). 
Conducting optimal central bank policy, however, requires a thorough understanding of 
banks’ attitude towards risk taking following monetary policy actions. Providing 
evidence on the link between monetary policy as well as commercial property prices and 
the risk-taking incentives of banks is the purpose of this paper.  
We use the theoretical setup by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) to show the conditions under 
which banks increase risk following a decline in the monetary policy rate. In their model, 
banks hold a portfolio of risky loans, financed with deposits and equity. Monitoring can 
increase the probability of loan repayment. The deposit rate is fixed at the policy rate, but 
equity requires paying a mark-up over the policy rate. In this baseline model, there is a 
pass-through effect in the sense that lower policy rates decrease loan rates. This pass-
through effect lowers the incentives to monitor (i.e. risk increases) and it can be 
interpreted as a “search for yield” effect.
1  In addition, there is a risk-shifting effect 
because risk can be shifted from depositors to equity-holders. The importance of the risk-
shifting effect depends on the degree of leverage of the bank. If bank equity is low, 
monitoring increases with a lower policy rate; if bank equity is high, monitoring 
decreases.  
Besides monetary policy actions, developments in the real estate markets affect collateral 
values, and this has implications for banks’ risk-taking choices. We thus modify the 
model by allowing lending to be backed by collateral. An increase in the liquidation 
                                                 
1 The link between low interest rates, risk taking, and “search for yield” has been described as follows: 
“[…] These behaviors can be compounded in an environment of low interest rates. Some investment 
managers have fixed rate obligations which force them to take on more risk as rates fall. Others like hedge 
funds have compensation structures that offer them a fraction of the returns generated, and in an 
atmosphere of low returns, the desire to goose them up increases. Thus not only do the incentives of some 
participants to "search for yield" increase in a low rate environment, but also asset prices can spiral 
upwards, creating the conditions for a sharp and messy realignment.” (Quoted from: Raghuram G. Rajan, 
The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future, Saturday, August 27, 2005, Jackson Hole, Wyoming) Of 
course, incentives to take risks are also shaped by the regulatory and institutional environment (Hellwig 
2008). As we focus only on banks that are active in the U.S., we cannot investigate the impact of 
differences in regulations across countries.   3
value of the collateral reduces the gains from monitoring. Intuitively, banks optimally 
choose to reduce monitoring efforts, ending up with a riskier loan portfolio. The model 
shows the importance of modeling collateral shocks and the degree of collateralization of 
loans. 
We use a small-scale vector autoregressive model (VAR) and a factor-augmented VAR 
(FAVAR) for the U.S. to analyze the reaction of banks’ risk taking to monetary policy 
and commercial property price shocks. The empirical models comprise GDP growth, 
GDP deﬂator inﬂation, commercial property price inﬂation, the monetary policy interest 
rate, and information on business lending provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Terms of Business Lending (STBL). The STBL questionnaire asks banks, classified into 
small domestic, large domestic and foreign banks, to rate the risk of new loans based on 
the borrower’s credit history, cash flow, credit rating, access to alternative sources of 
finance, management quality, collateral, and quality of the guarantor. Hence, we can 
control for contract terms that potentially affect the riskiness of loans. The STBL survey 
focuses on new loans, unlike other data sources that do not allow separating new and 
outstanding loans. This distinction is important if the goal is to analyze risk taking by 
banks.
2  
In the VAR, we use only a small subset of the series contained in the STBL. Specifically, 
we look at reactions of risk-weighted loans and loan spreads to shocks and compare them 
with reactions of unweighted loans and spreads. Compared to the VAR, the FAVAR 
allows exploiting a much larger amount of data. All information contained in the survey 
are condensed into common factors which are, in turn, included in the FAVAR. The 
FAVAR thus enables us to test the theoretical predictions concerning the heterogeneous 
responses of banks to monetary policy and collateral shocks. 
Our main findings are as follows. There is no evidence of a risk-taking channel for the 
entire banking system after expansionary monetary policy shocks. This masks, however, 
important differences across banking groups. Small domestic banks take on more new 
risk, while foreign banks lower risk, and large domestic banks do not change their 
exposure to new risk. From a theoretical point of view, these differences can be traced to 
differences in the degree of capitalization and in the monitoring technologies across 
banks.  Shocks to commercial property prices, our proxy for the collateral value of 
business lending, lead to higher risk across all banking groups, confirming the theoretical 
                                                 
2 The paper does not consider the existing loans. One cannot exclude that the riskiness of those loans 
changes after the shocks considered with consequences for the total risk (i.e. risk of new and outstanding 
loans) of banks.   4
prediction. Lending rates move closely in line with policy rates after the two shocks. This 
response of lending rates is very similar across banks and risk categories, indicating a 
high degree of price competition in U.S. banking. 
Our paper is related to recent empirical studies analyzing the link between monetary 
policy and bank risk. Table 1 provides an overview of this literature, and we include 
evidence on the impact of fluctuations in house prices on risk. This literature does not 
come to a consistent conclusion on how monetary policy affects risk. A first set of papers 
finds that lower interest rates increase bank risk. This branch of the literature includes 
studies using bank-level data (Altunbas et al. 2010, Ioannidou et al. 2009, Jiménez et al. 
2010),
3 time series (FAVAR and VAR) evidence for the U.S. (Eickmeier and Hofmann 
2010, Angeloni et al. 2010, or Lang and Nakamura 1995), or univariate regressions (De 
Nicolò et al. 2010).   
Another set of studies finds that risk falls following expansionary monetary policy (and 
house price) shocks. Again, this literature uses different empirical techniques such as the 
FAVAR methodology to micro-level data from U.S. banks (Buch et al. 2010) or an 
integrated micro-macro model for Germany (De Graeve et al. 2008). 
These studies differ in various respects. First, they differ in the way they measure bank 
risk. The risk-taking channel as advanced by Rajan (2005) and Borio and Zhu (2008) 
describes the incentives to engage in ex ante riskier projects. Some studies focus 
explicitly on (ex post) risk (Buch et al. 2010, De Graeve et al. 2008) and find – as 
expected – a decline in risk to the extent that the value of the underlying collateral 
increases. Studies that distinguish between realized risk (on existing loans) and new risk 
(on new loans) are Ioannidou et al. (2009) and Jiménez et al. (2010), who use 
confidential data at the bank-borrower level. De Nicolò et al (2010) also rely on data 
from the STBL.
4 They use a measure of average internal risk rating assigned to loans by 
the bank and the loan spread over the Federal Funds rate, which are similar to the 
measures we use in our VAR, but they use a univariate regression framework. 
Second, the studies surveyed in Table 1 differ in the way they model the interaction 
between banks and the macroeconomy and in the way they define monetary policy 
shocks. The panel studies regress risk measures on monetary policy interest rates and 
additional explanatory variables. These studies allow interest rates and other 
                                                 
3 In addition, according to Altunbas et al. (2010), bank risk increases with positive house price growth. 
4 Lang and Nakamura (1995) also use STBL data but focus on the sample period 1979-1992 when banks 
were not yet asked to assign new loans to different risk categories.   5
macroeconomic factors to affect banks, but generally do not take into account feedback 
from banks to the macroeconomy. The VAR- or FAVAR-based studies allow for mutual 
interaction between banks and the macroeconomy. In addition they focus on identified, 
mutually orthogonal, macroeconomic shocks.  
Our main contribution stems from the fact that we combine different aspects of the above 
research. First, we jointly analyze the effect of identified monetary policy and 
commercial property price shocks on bank risk taking with respect to new loans. Second, 
our model allows for mutual feedback between the macroeconomy and the banking 
sector. Third, we derive impulse responses of more and less risky bank loans to 
commercial property price shocks which have not been investigated much before. 
In Section 2, we briefly review the theoretical mechanism we have in mind based on 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010). In Section 3, we describe our data. In Sections 4 and 5, we 
present our empirical results from the VAR and the FAVAR, respectively. In Section 6, 
we conclude. 
2  The Theoretical Mechanism 
The theoretical banking literature has only recently started to explicitly analyze the role 
of monetary policy in banks’ risk-taking decisions (Agur and Demertzis 2010, 
Dell’Ariccia et al. 2010).
5  In the model by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010), which we 
summarize in Table 2, monitoring of loan applicants is the only channel through which 
risk can be reduced. Alternatively, banks can require borrowers to pledge collateral 
(Bester and Hellwig 1987).  
In Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010), banks recover nothing from a borrower in case a project 
does not succeed. To capture the effects of collateral without changing the basic structure 
of their model, we assume that the value of the project is backed by some collateral value. 
                                                 
5 Our focus in this section is on partial equilibrium models of the banking sector. Recently, dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models have been modified to include an active banking sector. While these 
models have similar qualitative implications for lending volumes in response to changes in the stance of 
monetary policy, implications for risk differ. The models of Angeloni et al. (2010) and Angeloni and Faia 
(2009) predict a risk-taking channel of monetary policy, while models such as those of Zhang (2009) and 
Dib (2010) predict a risk-reducing effect of cuts in the monetary policy instrument. See Buch et al. (2010) 
for a detailed discussion.   6
Other than that, our model is identical to theirs.
6 Profits of a representative bank are 
given by: 
() () ( ) () L E D L r L cq k r w q k r r q ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
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where loans are the bank’s only assets.  ( ) L r L is loan demand as a negative function of the 
loan rate:  () 0 < ∂ ∂ L L r r L . Banks can influence the probability that a project succeeds – 
which happens with probability q – by monitoring the borrower. Monitoring costs are 




cq . In case the project fails – which happens 
with probability  q − 1  – banks recover a liquidation value from the project w which is 
strictly smaller than the risk free rate  r w< and proportional to the volume of lending.  
Banks fund themselves with deposits and equity, which are a fixed fraction k of total 
assets. The deposit rate is identical to the refinancing rate  r rD = . Depositors are repaid 
only in case of success, but they are covered by a fairly priced deposit insurance. Risk 
has thus no impact on the deposit rate. The rate of return on equity depends on the 
refinancing rate, and on an equity risk premium which decreases linearly in the 
probability of success of the project:  aq r rE − + = ξ .
7 
The model is solved by backward induction in two steps. In a first step, banks optimally 
choose the lending rate. In a second step, and given the lending rate, banks choose the 
probability of monitoring. Banks choose the optimal monitoring intensity according to: 
() [] ()0 1 = − + − − − =
∂
Π ∂
L D L r L cq ak w k r r
q
     (2) 
or  () () ak w k r r
c
q D L + − − − = 1
1 ˆ .  
                                                 
6 Literature on the use of screening and sorting through collateral as two devices to control the risk of 
banks’ asset portfolios is based on the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this paper, higher 
lending rates lead to an increase in risk because of adverse selection and moral hazard effects. In the 
banking literature, the solution to banks’ optimization problem involves the specification of optimal 
contracts which take the participation and incentive constraints of borrowers and/or lenders into account. 
The model we use here is much simpler since it simply serves to illustrate the main theoretical intuition 
behind our empirical model. 
7 The liquidation value of the collateral could be used to capture bankruptcy costs. Even if the liquidation 
value would accrue to the equity holders, equity holder would still be subject to some downside risk 
because the return from liquidation is lower than the risk free rate. This rationalizes the assumption that 
equity holders demand a risk premium over the risk free rate when providing capital.    7
Optimal monitoring decreases in the costs of monitoring, in the policy rate (because 
r rD = ), and in collateral values. It increases in lending rates and in the degree of 
capitalization. For  given interest rates, banks with high monitoring costs respond more 


























. This is the 
same result as in Dell’Arriccia et al. (2010). Banks with higher monitoring costs also 











Yet, banks also adjust their lending rate in response to changes in the policy rate and 
collateral values. Solving for the first stage of the model, hence endogenizing the 
response of lending rates, it can be shown that well-capitalized banks lower monitoring if 
the policy rate decreases while poorly capitalized banks increase monitoring.
9 Intuitively, 
for low levels of capitalization, the risk-shifting effect dominates. Lower policy rates 
imply an increase in intermediation margins ( D L r r − ), thus banks predominantly funded 
with insured deposits have an incentive to monitor in order to realize the gains from 
higher margins. Monitoring increases (risk decreases). For high levels of capital, the 
pass-through effect dominates since for those banks the gains from the higher margins 
are relatively modest due to the high share of funding via equity capital. Monitoring 
decreases (risk increases). 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) model two extensions of their baseline framework. In the first 
extension, banks endogenously choose their capital structure. In this case, leverage 
decreases with the policy rate and monitoring always increases when the policy rate 
increases. In our empirical model below, we focus on the adjustment of banks to 
macroeconomic shocks at business cycle frequency. The impact effect of macroeconomic 
shocks thus resembles the situation with exogenous capital. Over time, banks can adjust 
their capital structures, and the response to shocks should become more similar across 
banking groups. 
                                                 













r E E . 
9 The formal proofs are very similar to those presented in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010).   8
In the second extension, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) model adjustment of banks under the 
assumption of perfect competition versus monopoly power of banks. The greater the 
degree of competition, the faster is the pass-through of changes in policy rates onto 
lending rates. Hence, margins are less sensitive to changes in policy rates in more 
competitive markets, the risk-shifting effect becomes less important, and the pass through 
effect starts to dominate. 
Overall, the model shows that lower policy rates lead to more risk-taking in 
environments where banks can adjust their capital structure. If the adjustment of the 
capital structure is limited, the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is less pronounced 
for poorly capitalized banks and/or banks with market power.  
The baseline model assumes a representative bank, but an extension accommodating 
differences across banks would be straight forward. For instance, different banks (such as 
domestic and foreign banks) can have different monitoring costs. High monitoring costs 
indicate low productivity and thus impede asset growth. Hence, the monitoring costs of 
small banks are higher than those of large banks: 
e l small c c
arg > . (Note that this 
specification does not distinguish between the costs of acquiring soft versus hard 
information. Hence, it is not inconsistent with a relative cost advantage of small banks in 
the acquisition of soft information.) 
Moreover, if screening costs involve a fixed component, small banks, are ceteris paribus, 
less likely to screen than large banks, and they are more likely to use collateral as an 
alternative sorting mechanism. Consistent with this interpretation, our data show that, on 
average, 77% of the loan portfolio of small banks is backed by collateral as compared to 
39% for the large domestic banks and only 22% for the foreign banks.
10 This pattern is 
quite consistent across the different risk categories: in the highest risk category 
(acceptable risk), 88% of loans given out by small banks are backed by collateral, 
compared to 63% for the domestic and 23% for the foreign banks. The shares of loans in 
the high risk category are more similar with 24% for the large banks, 31% for small 
banks, and 34% for foreign banks. A priori, we thus expect lending of small banks to be 
relatively more sensitive to changes in collateral values. 
Finally, one could modify the model to accommodate the fact that foreign banks are also 
affected by the foreign monetary policy rate r* by specifying the deposit rate as 
() * ,r r r r D D = . Because foreign banks are able to raise loanable funds in foreign markets, 
                                                 
10 See Section 3.2 for a more detailed description of the STBF data.   9
for instance via internal capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg forthcoming), it is 
reasonable to assume that the elasticity of foreign banks’ funding costs with respect to 













Hence, foreign banks can be expected to respond less to domestic shocks. 
 
In sum, the model yields the following hypotheses concerning the impact of monetary 
policy and collateral shocks:  
(i) Impact of monetary policy shocks: Monitoring and lending rates depend on the policy 
rate. If capital is exogenous, monitoring declines (i.e. risk-taking increases) if refinancing 
rates fall for well-capitalized banks and increases for poorly capitalized banks. If banks 
adjust leverage, monitoring unambiguously decreases (risk increases). The impact of 
changes in monetary policy rates on risk taking also depends on the market power of 
banks: Banks with monopoly power lower risk; banks operating in competitive markets 
increase risk. Optimal lending rates increase in the policy rate. 
(ii)  Impact of collateral shocks: Banks use monitoring and collateral as substitute 
mechanisms to control risk. If collateral values increase, the intensity of monitoring falls. 
Banks with higher monitoring costs react more to changes in collateral. Optimal lending 
rates decrease in collateral shocks. In the empirical model, we will capture these shocks 
through commercial property price shocks. 
3  Data 
3.1  Macroeconomic Data  
Our set of macroeconomic variables comprises the differences of the logarithms of GDP, 
of the GDP deflator, and of real commercial property prices as well as the level of the 
effective Federal Funds rate. Commercial property prices approximate the value of 
collateral.  Since our focus lies on business loans, we use commercial property prices 
instead of residential property prices which are more relevant for consumer loans. Real 
commercial property prices are measured as the transactions-based price index 
constructed based on data from the National Council of Real Estate Investment 
Fiducaries (NCREIF) by the MIT Center for Real Estate, divided by the GDP deflator. 
Data on the Federal Funds rate are retrieved from freelunch.com, a free Internet service 
provided by Moody’s Economy.com. Data on GDP and the GDP deflator are taken from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP, the GDP deflator and the policy rate are   10
variables which are commonly included in small-scale macroeconomic VARs. The 
macroeconomic series are plotted in Figure 1a. 
3.2  Banking Data  
Our source for banking data is the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Survey of Terms of 
Business Lending (STBL).
11 This survey collects data on gross new loans made during 
the first full business week in the mid-month of each quarter. The panel for the survey is 
a stratified sample of more than 400 institutions. The STBL contains information on loan 
volumes and on loan contract terms. This information is available for all commercial 
banks as well as for three banking groups: large domestic banks, small domestic banks, 
and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. For foreign banks, the data do not 
distinguish between large and small banks. However, it is well known that internationally 
active firms and banks are larger than their domestic counterparts (e.g. Cetorelli and 
Goldberg forthcoming). 
The STBL provides information on riskiness of new loans. Banks are asked to classify 
new business loans extended during the survey week into one of the following four 
categories of increasing risk: ”minimal risk”, ”low risk”, ”moderate risk”, 
and ”acceptable risk”. The classification of loans is based on a number of indicators 
which are condensed into a risk rating for loans. This classification takes hard 
information (cash flow, credit history, credit ratings, quality of collateral) as well as soft 
information (management quality) and, hence, practically all aspects of loan quality into 
account. Therefore, a shift in the composition of bank loans across different risk 
categories reflects changes in the credit standards. On average, moderate risk loans have 
been the most important category (41% of total loans), followed by loans in the highest 
risk category “acceptable” risk (28%), low risk loans (23%), and minimal risk loans (8%).   
As regards information on contract terms, the STBL survey additionally includes 
information on the shares of loans made under commitment, secured by collateral, 
subject to prepayment penalty, loan size, the loan rate, and the loan maturity. We include 
this information for the entire banking sector, for the subgroups of banks, and for the four 
different risk categories. This accounts for the fact that banks can change the risk and the 
return of their loan portfolio in a number of ways. They can vary the intensity of 
                                                 
11 See Brady et al. (1998) for a detailed discussion of the structure of the STBL. We choose not to combine 
the STBL data with information from other sources on U.S. banks such as the Call Reports. Our 
information on the sample composition underlying the STBL survey is insufficiently detailed, and we want 
to avoid introducing additional measurement or aggregation errors.   11
monitoring, they can change the degree of collateralization, they can charge penalty rates, 
or they can modify the maturity structure. While the monitoring choice cannot be 
observed, including other choice variables minimizes omitted variables problems and 
allows isolating the effects of macroeconomic shocks on bank lending, bank risk taking, 
and lending rates.  
How does the classification of loans according to these criteria match the definition of 
bank risk in the theoretical model by Dell’Arricia et al. (2010)? The data classify loans 
into different risk categories based on observed contract terms. Monitoring, which is the 
main determinant of bank risk in the theoretical model, cannot be observed. Given the 
observed terms in loan contracts, any shift in the structure of loans across risk categories 
must thus be due to changes in the monitoring intensity of banks.  
Our panel of banking data contains 140 variables.
12 Loan volumes are divided by the 
GDP deflator and, hence, enter in real terms. The sample period is 1997Q2 to 2008Q2. 
The beginning of the sample is restricted by the availability of the information on loan 
riskiness which starts with the May 1997 survey. We exclude the period after the second 
quarter of 2008 because unconventional monetary policy measures weaken the 
usefulness of the Federal Funds rate to identify monetary policy shocks.  
The VAR analysis (Section 4) includes, besides the macro variables, summary measures 
of the lending and risk-taking behavior of the U.S. commercial banking system. These 
measures are unweighted loans and loan spreads and, alternatively, risk-weighted loans 
and loan spreads. The risk-weighted measures are constructed in the spirit of Basel II 
based on information from the STBL. The weights for loans of minimal, low, moderate 
and acceptable risk are 0.06, 0.16, 0.31, and 0.47, respectively.
13 This produces a loan 
index and a loan spread that increase in risk. The (unweighted and weighted) loan indices 
enter in differences in the VAR. The spreads enter in levels. The weighted index’ growth 
rate and the spread as well as their unweighted counterparts are plotted in Figure 1b. The 
figure shows that risky loans indeed increased considerably in the years before the latest 
crisis (2004-2005) while growth of unweighted loans was somewhat lower over this 
                                                 
12 Two of the 140 series have missing values in one quarter each. We use the EM algorithm to interpolate 
these series. See for details Stock and Watson (2002).  
13  According to the Basel II guidelines (BIS 2005), the standard risk weight for unrated claims on 
corporates is 100%. For rated firms, the risk weights are 20% (AAA to AAA+), 50% (A+ to A-), 100% 
(BBB+ to BB-), and 150% for ratings below BB-. We have rescaled the weighted 0.2, 0.5, 1 and 1.5 to sum 
up to 1 which yields the weighted presented in the main text. Our measure of risk-weighted loans is not 
identical to risk-weighted assets because we consider business loans only.   12
period. Interestingly, the risk-weighted spreads have exceeded the unweighted spreads in 
particular since 2003. 
For the FAVAR analysis (Section 5), we exploit all information provided in the STBL. 
We treat the banking data as usual for factor analysis. All series are seasonally adjusted. 
Stationarity of the 20 loan series in the dataset is ensured by taking differences of their 
logarithms. The time series on loan rates, the percentage share of loans made under 
commitment, and the percentage share of loans secured by collateral can be considered to 
be stationary in levels. Hence, we do not (log) difference them. The stationary series are 
then demeaned and standardized to have unit variance. Finally, we remove outliers, 
defined as observations with absolute median deviations larger than three times the 
interquartile range. They are replaced by the median value of the preceding five 
observations (Stock and Watson 2005). All series from the survey are then summarized 
in a  ( 140) 1 N =×  vector  [ ] 1 X ... ' tt N t xx = , and Xt  enters the FAVAR model. 
4  Evidence from the VAR  
Before carrying out the FAVAR analysis, we estimate two small-scale VARs to gain first 
insights into the dynamics of aggregate bank risk. The main advantage of a parsimonious 
VAR compared to a large-dimensional FAVAR approach is that we save on degrees of 
freedom because we only include two additional variables to our set of macroeconomic 
variables as opposed to four factors as we will determine below. This might be 
particularly useful because our sample is short. 
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where  t y Δ   is GDP growth,  t p Δ  is  GDP deflator inflation,  t cpp Δ  is  real commercial 
property price inflation, and  t ffr  is the Federal Funds rate.  t l Δ  denotes the growth rate of 
loans, and  t ls  is the loan rate over the Federal Funds rate. In the first VAR,  t l  and  t ls  
capture the risk-weighted loan index and the risk-weighted loan spread as described 
above. In the second VAR, the risk-weighted measures are replaced by their unweighted 
counterparts. A comparison between the weighted and the unweighted measures will give   13
us some first indication on risk taking by banks: If risk-weighted loans rise more than 
unweighted loans, this indicates risk taking by the banks. d  comprises constants,  () L Ψ  
is a lag polynomial of finite order q , and wt  is an error term which is i.i.d. with zero 
mean and covariance matrix Ω. We set  1 q =  as suggested by the BIC.  
Monetary policy and commercial property price shocks shocks are identified by applying 
a Cholesky decomposition. We assume that GDP, aggregate prices and property prices do 
not react contemporaneously to shock to bank loans, loan spreads, and the monetary 
policy rate, which is fairly standard in SVAR studies. GDP and the overall price level 
react with a delay to property price movements (see, e.g., Jarociński and Smets 2008). 
Moreover, we allow the monetary policy instrument to respond contemporaneously to all 
shocks.  
While it is relatively common to use a Cholesky decomposition to identify housing 
shocks (see, e.g., Giuliodori 2005 and Iacoviello 2005), alternative identification schemes 
for the house price shock such as a combination of zero contemporaneous and long-run 
restrictions as, e.g., employed by Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2008) yield similar results.  
By ordering the policy instrument below loans and loan spreads, we follow most of the 
SVAR literature which jointly models macroeconomic and credit variables (Ciccarelli et 
al. 2010). The identification scheme implies that monetary policy can react 
instantaneously to bank loan and spread shocks, but not vice versa. The STBL is 
collected in order to inform the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decisions. Insofar, the 
information in the survey should be part of information of the Fed, which supports our 
identification assumption.  
It is somewhat more questionable whether banks might not be able to react immediately 
in their decision to extend new loans (or adjust loan rates) in response to unexpected 
movements in the policy rate. Berrospide and Edge (2010), for instance, assume that 
banking variables can react contemporaneously to innovations in the Federal Funds rate. 
Yet, reasons for sluggish adjustment of the banking sector to monetary policy could be 
the need to renegotiate existing contracts or close customer relationships that banks do 
not want to interrupt. The finding by the empirical banking literature that lending rates of 
banks are sticky and do not react quickly to market interest rates (Berger and Hannan 
1991) further supports our choice to order loan spreads before the Federal Funds rate. To 
test robustness with respect to the ordering, we have also ordered the monetary policy 
rate before the loan index and the spread, but the qualitative results do not change.  
Figures  2a and 2b show the responses of the endogenous variables to one standard 
deviation monetary policy and property price shocks, respectively. The solid black lines   14
represent the median impulse responses obtained from the VAR which includes the risk-
weighted loan and spread measures while the dark (light) blue shaded areas correspond to 
the confidence bands at the 68 (90)% significance level which were constructed based on 
the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method proposed by Kilian (1998). The dotted-dashed black 
lines represent the 68% confidence bands of impulse responses of the unweighted loan 
and spread measures. (We omit 90% confidence bands and median impulse responses for 
better visibility.) 
Following a monetary policy shock, we find an adjustment of macroeconomic indicators 
which is roughly in line with expectations. The Federal Funds rate drops on impact by 
roughly 25 basis points before gradually returning to zero after a bit more than a year. 
The point estimates show an increase in GDP, but the effect is only marginally 
significant. The GDP deflator and property prices rise permanently,
14 with a maximum 
effect reached after about two years. Reactions of macro variables to the shock are almost 
indistinguishable in both VARs. 
Banks’ risk-weighted and unweighted loans rise gradually
15  The delayed reactions 
suggest that second-round effects from movements in other macroeconomic variables 
after the monetary policy shock contribute to an increase in both loan measures. The 
induced rise in commercial property prices increases the value of collateral which may, 
in turn, affect overall lending and also induce a “flight out of safety”. Confidence bands 
overlap which suggests that differences between the loans’ reactions are not statistically 
significant. 
Figure 2a also shows that the loan spreads increase slightly after the monetary policy 
shock, suggesting that the loan rates decline a bit less than the Federal Funds rate, but 
overall follows it very closely. This confirms the negative link between the Federal 
Funds rate and lending spreads found by De Nicolò et al. (2010). Our results are, 
however. not in line with Ioannidou et al. (2009) who find a positive link between the 
Federal Funds rate and Bolivian lending spreads. The figure, again, reveals that responses 
of the risk-weighted and the unweighted spreads do not differ significantly.  
                                                 
14  Eickmeier and Hofmann (2010) also find a very sluggish and long-lasting reaction of commercial 
property prices to monetary policy shocks. 
15 The increase of the risk-weighted loan index is in line with De Nicolò et al. (2010) who use a similar 
risk measure.   15
Following the commercial property price shock, the two price variables and the Federal 
Funds rate increase, and this is could be responsible for the observed decline in GDP.
16 
Loans rise, and the difference between the reactions of weighted and unweighted 
measures is, again, not statistically significant. The spreads’ reactions are negative and 
very small in absolute terms; the confidence bands between the reactions of the risk-
weighted spread and the unweighted spread overlap. 
In sum, we find positive reactions of risk-weighted and unweighted loans to a monetary 
policy loosening and an unexpected increase in the commercial property price. The 
responses of risk-weighted and unweighted loans do probably not differ significantly. We 
should also take into account that the VAR approach does not allow us to disentangle 
supply from demand effects which is crucial if one aims at assessing whether a risk-
taking channel exists. Hence, the VAR results do not provide evidence in favor of the 
existence of a risk-taking channel.  
5  Evidence from the FAVAR  
We now move to the FAVAR model which allows exploiting all information available 
from the STBL and looking at heterogeneous effects on loans (and loan rates) across risk 
categories and banks. The FAVAR also allows testing more directly the theoretical 
predictions concerning the differential effects monetary policy shocks and shocks to the 
collateral value across banking groups  
5.1  The FAVAR Model  
The model assumes that our vector of banking variables collected from the STBL (Xt ) 
follows an approximate dynamic factor model (Stock and Watson 2002, Bai and Ng 2002) 
where each series  it x   is driven by the  1 r×   vector of common factors F t  and  an 
idiosyncratic (series-specific) component  it e :
17  
λ 'F it i t it xe =+ .          ( 5 )  
where λi  is a  1 r×  vector of factor loadings. The number of common factors is typically 
much smaller than the number of variables in Xt , hence  N r << . Common and series-
                                                 
16 Other studies which identify house price shocks based on residential property prices, find an increase in 
GDP. If we replace the commercial property price by the Freddie Mac residential property price, we also 
find an increase in GDP which is, however, only marginally significant. 
17 For a more thorough discussion of the empirical framework, see Bernanke et al. (2005) and Buch et al. 
(2010).   16
specific components are orthogonal, the common factors are mutually orthogonal; 
idiosyncratic components can be weakly mutually and serially correlated in the sense of 
Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983).  
Ft  can be decomposed into two parts: a set of observable factors Gt  and a set of latent 
(or unobservable) factors Ht  which both drive Xt :  [ ] FG ' H ' ' tt t = . We assume that Gt  
comprises the macroeconomic variables already used in the VAR, i.e.  t y Δ ,  t p Δ , 
t cpp Δ and  t ffr . The unobserved “banking” factors ( Ht ) need to be estimated. They 
summarize the banking variables and are orthogonal to the observable macroeconomic 
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,        ( 6 )  
where c comprises constants,  ) (L Φ  is a lag polynomial of finite order p , and vt  is an 
error term which is i.i.d. with zero mean and covariance matrix Q. Ht  thus replaces  t l Δ  
and  t ls  from equation (4). 
For identification of monetary policy and commercial property price shocks, we adopt a 
Cholesky ordering:  t y Δ  →  t p Δ  →  t cpp Δ  → Ht  →  t ffr . We verify whether our results 
are sensitive to the ordering, and we re-estimate the model with the ordering of the 
banking factors and the policy rate reversed. The main messages remain valid, and we 
make the results available upon request. 
5.2  Estimation and Specification  
The model is estimated in four steps. First, we regress each of the banking series  it x  on 
Gt . Second, we estimate the “banking factors” Ht   as the first  4 mr =− principal 
components from the residuals. Third, we model the joint dynamics of Gt  and  the 
estimate of Ht   in a VAR which we estimate equation-wise with OLS. Fourth, we 
identify monetary policy and commercial property price shocks as described above.  
Only two parameters need to be set: the number of common (latent and observable) 
factors (r ), (or m , the number of common (latent) banking variables), and the VAR 
order ( p ). m  is set to 4 (and, hence, r  equals 8) which is suggested by the  p1 IC  and the 
p2 IC  of Bai and Ng (2002) when applied to the regression residuals. We rely on the  p1 IC    17
and  p2 IC  since these criteria have been shown to perform well in small samples.  p  is set 
to 1, as suggested by the BIC. We experimented with a larger number of factors
18 and 
with  2 p = , but results (available upon request) remain basically unaffected. Given the 
short sample, we adopt the sparser parameterization. The latent banking factors are 
shown in Figure 1c. 
5.3  Commonality Among the Banking Variables  
One common concern is that factor models can be applied only if the data exhibit a factor 
structure (Boivin and Ng 2006). If the commonality, i.e. the variance share explained by 
the common factors, is low, the factors cannot be accurately estimated with principal 
components. In our model, the 8 (observable and latent) factors explain 58% of the 
overall variance in the banking dataset. This degree of comovement is similar to shares of 
60% or more usually found in macroeconomic datasets for the U.S. (e.g. Boivin et al. 
2009, Eickmeier and Hofmann 2010). This result is comforting given that, in survey data, 
reporting errors add to measurement error inherent in every dataset. The STBL data are 
based on the reported answers of the surveyed banks, and the Federal Reserves’ Staff 
generates estimates for the entire banking sector, which adds an additional estimation 
error.  
To nevertheless address concerns related to the existence of a factor structure in our data, 
we follow Boivin and Ng (2006). We estimate latent financial factors Ht  as before as the 
first 4 principal components from the regression residuals. We weight each series in Xt  
by the inverse of the standard deviation of its idiosyncratic component. We then repeat 
the regression and the principal component steps described above on the weighted data. 
Results (available upon request) barely change, and we proceed with our benchmark 
factor estimates extracted from unweighted data. 
We now analyze the commonality of the variables of interest, i.e. loan growth and loan 
spreads. Table 3 shows variance shares explained by all latent (banking) and observed 
factors and by the observed macroeconomic factors. (The differences between these are 
the shares explained only by the latent banking factors.) The factors explain 57% of the 
variation in the growth of loans for all loans. There is some heterogeneity across banking 
groups and risk categories. The commonality tends to be higher for large than for small 
banks. One explanation is that local and regional conditions unrelated to macroeconomic 
developments play a more important role for smaller banks. The result may, however, 
                                                 
18 See Boivin et al. (2009) for a similar approach.    18
also reflect that shocks contained in Ht  first hit large, systemically relevant, banks and 
are then transmitted to the macroeconomy and/or other banks in the system. Both 
explanations are supported by our additional finding that the shares of loan growth 
explained by common latent (banking) factors are much larger for large banks than for 
small banks. The shares explained by the common macroeconomic factors for small 
banks exceed those for large banks in most of the risk categories.  
For loan rates, the commonality is much higher than for loan volumes. The commonality 
for all banks and all loans amounts to 97%. This indicates a high degree of pass through 
from policy to lending rates as suggested by the very large shares explained by the 
observed factors (which include the policy rate). Another possible explanation is high 
degree of price competition. 
5.4  Empirical Results 
Figure 3 presents impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to the monetary 
policy shock (Figure 3a) and the commercial property price shock (Figure 3b). The 
reactions of the macroeconomic variables to the two shocks look very similar to those 
obtained from the VAR. A few differences are worth mentioning. First, the monetary 
policy shock is smaller, leading to a decline in the policy rate only by about 17 basis 
points (compared to 25 basis points in the VAR). One possible explanation is that shocks 
to factors which were omitted from the VAR were (mistakenly) attributed to monetary 
policy shocks. As a consequence, the impact on property prices and on the GDP deflator 
is also smaller. Second, the positive effect of a monetary policy shock on GDP is clearly 
significant between quarters 1 to 4 after the shock before turning back to zero, consistent 
with long-run real neutrality of monetary policy. Third, as regards the response following 
the commercial property price shock, the only notable difference between the VAR and 
FAVAR results is that, in the FAVAR, the positive interest rate response is less persistent 
and only marginally significant. Again, movements in other (banking) factors which were 
not included in the VAR might have been captured by movements in the Federal Funds 
rate. 
5.4.1  Reaction of New Loans and Loan Spreads to Monetary Policy Shocks 
Figure 4 shows the reactions of new loans (Figure 4a) and loan spreads (loan rate over 
the Federal Funds rate) (Figure 4b) to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The first 
row shows responses of all loans and in different risk categories made by all banks. Rows 
2-4 show responses of loans and loan spreads by small domestic, large domestic and 
foreign banks. Table 4 then allows assessing whether differences in the reactions between   19
loans to high-risk and low-risk borrowers within the same banking group and differences 
across risk categories are significant. Numbers in bold indicate significance at the 90% 
level.  
From Figure 4a it is apparent that total new business loans increase following the 
monetary policy shock. The increase is quite persistent, possibly because property prices 
and thus collateral values also rise quite persistently following the shock. While an 
increase in aggregate business loans is in line with the theoretical set-up presented above 
as well as larger-scale macroeconomic models (Christiano et al. 2010, Gerali et al. 
2010),
19 empirical (time-series) studies typically find the opposite, i.e. that business loans 
decrease after a monetary policy loosening (or increase after a monetary policy 
tightening). Two main reasons have been suggested for this “perverse” reaction of 
business loans. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that firms raise their loan demand to 
finance the increase in inventories triggered by an interest rate hike. Den Haan et al. 
(2007), by contrast, suggest that banks substitute long-term consumer and real estate 
loans by relatively safe, short-term business loans after a monetary policy tightening. 
Hence, it is an increase in business loan supply that can explain the finding. 
How can we explain our results in the light of this discussion? One interpretation of our 
results is that the increase in loans primarily reflects loan supply rather than loan demand 
effects. This would be encouraging since the risk-taking channel concerns loan supply, 
not loan demand. Since we have only loans to firms in our dataset, we cannot check 
whether reactions of consumer or real estate loans differ from those of business loans. 
From Figure 4a, we do not see a shift in the composition of banks’ portfolios from 
relatively safe to less safe (i.e. relatively risky) business loans for the aggregate of all 
banks after an expansionary monetary shock. This also holds true for the groups of large 
domestic and (mostly large) foreign banks. By contrast, such a shift is indeed observed 
for small banks. After the monetary policy shock, small banks strongly and significantly 
extend relatively risky loans, but not loans with minimal risk.  
Surprisingly, the aggregate of all banks extends their lending to high-risk borrowers 
significantly less (not more) than their lending to low-risk borrowers (Table 4a). This 
response is driven by the foreign banks. By contrast, small banks on impact extend their 
lending to high-risk firms significantly more than their lending to low-risk firms after 
monetary policy shocks. The differential impact effect is also positive and statistically 
                                                 
19 See Zhang (2009) for a theoretical model in which lending temporarily increases after contractionary 
monetary policy shocks.    20
significant for large firms, but it is tiny in magnitude. After 4 quarters, differences are not 
statistically significant for any of the subgroups of banks. We also find that, on impact, 
small banks increase loans to high-risk and moderate-risk borrowers significantly more 
strongly than large and foreign banks (Table 4b). Lending to low-risk borrowers by small 
banks is, by contrast, significantly smaller than that by large and foreign banks. After one 
year, only differences in lending to high-risk and moderate-risk borrowers are significant.  
The fact that smaller banks increase new lending to higher risk borrowers significantly 
more than large and foreign banks would be consistent with theoretical priors derived in 
Section 2 if smaller banks were more highly capitalized, faced higher monitoring costs 
and/or had smaller monopoly power than larger and foreign banks.  
As concerns capitalization of banks, we find, based on individual bank data from the U.S. 
Call Reports, a negative and significant correlation between the size of banks and the 
capital ratio: we ran a cross-section regression of the size of banks, captured by the 
logarithm of assets, on the capital ratio, i.e. equity capital divided by total capital, (both 
averaged over the period 1997-2008) and a constant; we find a negative, highly 
significant relation (regression coefficient: -0.005, t-statistic: -18.4) between size and 
capitalization. Another piece of evidence is provided by Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(forthcoming). They document that small domestic banks are, on average, more highly 
capitalized than large domestic banks. Also, large domestic banks are better capitalized 
than large global banks. In their Table 1, Cetorelli and Goldberg provide capitalization 
ratios for different banking groups over the period 1980-2006: large domestic banks 
(7.2%), large global banks (6.4%), small banks in domestic bank holding companies 
(8.0%), and small banks in global bank holding companies (7.6%), respectively.  
Monitoring costs are unobserved, but one could argue that monitoring involves fixed 
costs which large banks can shoulder more easily. The fact that small banks have a much 
higher share of collateralized loans (see Section 2) points into this direction. 
Finally, Berger (1995: 429) has argued that “only the larger firms in the market […] are 
able to exercise market power in pricing well-differentiated products through advertising, 
locational, or other advantages”. This suggests that all three factors, capitalization, 
monopoly power and monitoring costs help indeed explain our finding of the differential 
effects between small and large banks. 
Importantly, the result that smaller banks react differently to monetary shocks than large 
banks also suggests that growth in lending to high-risk borrowers is indeed supply driven, 
thereby indicating the presence of an active risk-taking channel of monetary policy. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Angeloni et al (2002) argue that differences among banks   21
in the response of loans to a monetary policy shock can be labeled as supply driven, 
provided that bank customers of the different banks are similar. Our data provide a 
breakdown of loans by borrower characteristics. Because borrowers in the same risk 
category are likely to be fairly homogeneous, this enables us to identify supply effects 
and, hence, the risk-taking channel.  
Another finding is worth emphasizing. Foreign banks do not change or increase relatively 
safe loans, but they significantly reduce risky loans. Foreign banks, similar to large 
domestic banks, have on average lower capitalization ratios than small banks (Cetorelli 
and Goldberg forthcoming). In this sense, our result is consistent with the theoretical 
model by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010). Also, foreign banks can be expected to react less to 
changes in the policy rate since their funding structure allows shielding their lending 
decision from changes in the domestic policy rate. Foreign banks might also have 
superior investment possibilities. Following a reduction in the policy rate, foreign banks 
might be able to shift loanable funds more easily across countries in order to compensate 
low interest rate in the U.S.. It should be noted though that we do not model 
developments on foreign variables since our data do not provide a classification of 
foreign banks by country of origin.  
Figure 4b shows rather small impulse responses of loan spreads, and the impulse 
responses of loan rates look very much like those of the Federal Funds rate. Loan rates 
decline after the monetary policy shock, as predicted by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010), and 
they do so by less than the Federal Funds rate. This confirms the negative link between 
the Federal Funds rate and lending spreads found already in the VAR. Differences across 
different banking groups and risk categories are not visible from the graphs. Although a 
formal analysis shows us that differences are in some cases statistically significant, they 
are likely to be economically negligible. Hence, we refrain from presenting differences 
and significance levels in detail as we did for loans in Table 4. 
5.4.2  Reaction of New Loans and Loan Spreads to Commercial Property Price Shocks 
In Figure 5, we show impulse responses of new loans and loan spreads to the property 
price (collateral) shock. Average lending significantly increases in response to the shock, 
in line with our VAR results. Small domestic, large domestic, and foreign banks all raise 
lending to high-risk borrowers, consistent with the theoretical prediction. At the same 
time small domestic banks lend less, and large banks do not change their lending to low-
risk borrowers, while foreign banks increase lending to low-risk borrowers.    22
Table 4a reveals that the impact reaction of loans to low-risk borrowers is significantly 
smaller (larger) than the reaction of loans to high-risk borrowers for small (foreign) 
banks. Reactions of lending by large banks and by all banks do not significantly differ 
across risk categories. This indicates additional risk taking only by small banks after 
property price shocks.  
Table 4b shows that small banks react more to the commercial property price shock than 
large domestic and foreign banks. This indicates the presence of a risk-taking channel of 
commercial property prices. Lending spreads barely change, indicating that lending rates 
move very much like the Federal Funds rate. We do, again, not observe differences 
across banking groups and risk categories.  
5.4.3  Discussion of Results 
The FAVAR methodology allows analyzing the risk-taking channel in more detail than 
the VAR by decomposing the data across banking groups and loan categories and by 
controlling for theoretically important loan contract terms such as interest rates and the 
degree of collateralization.  
We find that small banks take on additional new risk after monetary policy shocks, and 
that foreign banks lower their lending to high-risk borrower. Large domestic banks do 
not significantly change their risk-taking behaviour. These patterns are not inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that the degree of leverage is of importance in determining the effect 
of expansionary monetary policy shocks and that well capitalized banks take on more 
risk. The stylized facts that have been reported in this paper and in previous literature 
suggest that small banks in the U.S. are better capitalized than foreign banks. Hence, for 
the smaller banks, the pass-through effect stressed in the model by Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2010) is likely to dominate the risk-shifting effect. 
With respect to the collateral shock, theory predicts an unambiguously risk-increasing 
effect because collateral and monitoring are substitute technologies to control risk. We 
find that all banking groups increase lending into the highest risk category following the 
identified commercial property price shock. However, only small banks significantly 
load additional new risk. This is consistent with these banks having higher monitoring 
cost. According to theory, especially inefficient banks will reduce monitoring effort 
following an increase in the value of the underlying collateral. Similar to the findings of 
the monetary policy shock, small banks increase new lending to high-risk borrowers 
significantly more than large and foreign banks after the commercial property price 
shock. This points towards a risk-taking channel of collateral shocks.    23
6  Conclusion 
Many observers have argued that loose monetary policy is one main culprit for the 
excessive build up of risk in the U.S. banking industry in the run up to the global 
financial crisis. This observation has led to the recommendation that monetary authorities 
should explicitly consider aspects of financial, and in particular banking sector, stability 
when deciding on monetary policy actions. Yet, previous literature has not given a clear 
answer to the question whether loose monetary policy increases or decreases the risk of 
banks. Differences across studies partly owe to the level of aggregation of the data and 
partly owe to the measurement of risk.  
With this paper, we inform the debate about the effects of monetary policy on the risk-
taking decision of commercial U.S. banks. To capture changes in collateral values we 
include commercial property prices as an additional factor. Using a VAR and a FAVAR 
setup, we exploit information on the riskiness of banks’ new loan origination provided by 
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. These data have the 
advantage that they allow for an analysis of new loans and thus risk-taking behavior of 
banks. In this sense, we realign previous micro-level studies, which allow measuring risk 
taking of banks, with macro studies, which identify different macroeconomic shocks. In 
addition, we can analyze heterogeneity in the response to monetary policy and property 
price shocks across different banking groups. This takes into account recent theoretical 
insights that the risk-taking effects depend, inter alia, on the degree of capitalization, 
monopoly power and monitoring costs of banks. 
Our results suggest that there is no evidence for a risk-taking channel for the entire 
banking system after expansionary monetary policy and commercial property price 
shocks. This masks, however, important differences across banking groups. Small 
domestic banks increase their exposure to risk, while foreign banks lower risk, and large 
domestic banks do not significantly change their risk exposure after both shocks. We also 
find that lending rates move closely in line with policy rates. The response of lending 
rates after the two macroeconomic shocks is very similar across banks and risk categories, 
indicating a high degree of price competition in U.S. banking. 
It would be tempting to interpret our results in terms of the current discussion on risks in 
banking and the regulatory initiatives to increase the required capitalization of banks. We 
have argued that the risk-taking incentives of banks might be linked to their degree of 
capitalization. Our findings suggest that small and well-capitalized U.S. banks increase 
risk following a monetary contraction while foreign and less well-capitalized banks in the   24
U.S. lower risk. These patterns in the data correspond to the predictions of the baseline 
model in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) in which leverage is exogenous.  
However, our findings should not be interpreted in terms of higher capitalization being 
causal for an increase in risk taking for two main reasons. First, we have not estimated a 
structural model of bank capital and risk. In order to identify a particular theoretical 
mechanism on the link between capitalization and risk taking, it would be necessary to 
endogenize the degree of capitalization of banks and to model this explicitly. With 
endogenous leverage, risk unequivocally increases following an expansionary monetary 
policy shock in the model by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010). Second, the link between bank 
capital and risk is driven by a number of additional factors including changes in equity 
risk premia or changes in corporate governance structures of banks, all of which are not 
captured in our theoretical or empirical models 
Overall, the FAVAR methodology used in this paper provides a powerful tool for 
analyzing heterogeneity across banking groups and loan market segments with regard to 
responses to macroeconomic shocks. It shows, most importantly, that ignoring the 
feedback between the banking sector and the macroeconomy or ignoring heterogeneous 
responses may lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the link between risks in 
banking and the macroeconomy. Hence, applying this methodology to further questions 
of systemic risk in banking or for the analysis on changed capital requirements for the 
risk-bearing capacity of the banking system would be an important step for future 
research.  
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8  Data Appendix 
 
This appendix provides the classification of loan risk according to the Survey of Terms of 
Business Lending. The following information is based on the instructions (FR 2028A), 
last updated December 11, 2008.
20 
 
Minimal Risk  
Loans in this category have virtually no chance of resulting in a loss. They would have a 
level of risk similar to a loan with the following characteristics: 
-  The customer has been with your institution for many years and has an excellent 
credit history. 
-  The customer’s cash flow is steady and well in excess of required debt repayments 
plus other fixed charges. 
-  The customer has an AA or higher public debt rating. 
-  The customer has excellent access to alternative sources of finance at favorable terms. 
-  The management is of uniformly high quality and has unquestioned character. 
-  The collateral, if required, is cash or cash equivalent and is equal to or exceeds the 
value of the loan. 
-  The guarantor, if required, would achieve approximately this rating if borrowing from 
your institution. 
 
Low Risk  
Loans in this category are very unlikely to result in a loss. They would have a level of 
risk similar to a loan with the following characteristics: 
-  The customer has an excellent credit history.  
-  The customer’s cash flow is steady and comfortably exceeds required debt 
repayments plus other fixed charges. 
-  The customer has a BBB or higher public debt rating. 
-  The customer has good access to alternative sources of finance at favorable terms. 
-  The management is of high quality and has unquestioned character. 
-  The collateral, if required, is sufficiently liquid and has a large enough margin to 
make very likely the recovery of the full amount of the loan in the event of default. 




Loans in this category have little chance of resulting in a loss. This category should 
include the average loan, under average economic conditions, at the typical lender. Loans 
in this category would have a level of risk similar to a loan with the following 
characteristics: 
-  The customer has a good credit history. 
                                                 
20 See http://www.ny.frb.org/banking/reportingforms/FR_2028a_s.html for details.   29
-  The customer’s cash flow may be subject to cyclical conditions but is adequate to 
meet required debt repayments plus other fixed charges even after a limited period of 
losses or in the event of a somewhat lower trend in earnings. 
-  The customer has limited access to the capital markets. 
-  The customer has some access to alternative sources of finance at reasonable terms. 
-  The firm has good management in important positions. 
-  Collateral, which would usually be required, is sufficiently liquid and has a large 
enough margin to make likely the recovery of the value of the loan in the event of 
default. 
-  The guarantor, if required, would achieve approximately this rating if borrowing from 
your institution.  
 
Acceptable Risk/Others  
Loans in this category have a limited chance of resulting in a loss. They would have a 
level of risk similar to a loan with the following characteristics: 
-  The customer has only a fair credit rating but no recent credit problems. 
-  The customer’s cash flow is currently adequate to meet required debt repayments, but 
it may not be sufficient in the event of significant adverse developments. 
-  The customer does not have access to the capital markets. 
-  The customer has some limited access to alternative sources of finance possibly at 
unfavorable terms. 
-  Some management weakness exists. 
-  Collateral, which would generally be required, is sufficient to make likely the 
recovery of the value of the loan in the event of default, but liquidating the collateral 
may be difficult or expensive. 
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Table 1: Overview of Previous Empirical Evidence on the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy 
Paper Data  Measure of bank 
risk  Method  Macroeconomic explanatory variables and 
controls 





data for listed U.S. 
and EU banks 
Moody’s expected 




Deviation of the interest rate from a benchmark 
(either Taylor rule rate or natural interest rate) 
used to measure banks’ incentive to load on 
new risk 
Other controls are changes in the policy rate, 
nominal GDP, the slope of the yield curve, 
house and stock prices. 
A decline in changes in policy rates 
lowers (ex post) bank risk.  
A negative deviation of the interest rate 
from the benchmark, i.e. expansionary 
monetary policy, leads to more risk 
taking.  






evidence for the 










VAR  Industrial production, employment, inflation 
monetary policy rate 
Positive reactions of various bank 
balance sheet risk in the U.S. and the 
euro area and of bank leverage in the 
U.S. 
No significant reactions of bank 
leverage in the euro area and of stock 
market volatility in the U.S. and the 
euro area. 
Buch et al. 
(2010) 
Time series and 
bank-level panel 
data for the U.S. 




Banks’ degree of 
capitalization 
FAVAR  Identification of monetary policy and other 
macroeconomic (supply, demand, house price) 
shocks imposing sign restrictions and 
contemporaneous zero restrictions on impulse 
responses 
Negative reaction of risk in banks’ 
balance sheets. Negative response does 
not depend on bank size, but is smaller 
in absolute terms if a bank is highly 
capitalized. 
Negative reaction of risk after an 
expansionary house price shock. 
Reaction does not depend on the size of 
a bank and its capitalization. 
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Paper  Data  Measure of bank risk  Method Macroeconomic  explanatory  variables 
and controls 
Effects of decline in monetary policy 
rates 
De Graeve 
et al. (2008) 
Micro-macro model 
for the German 
banking sector 
Banks’ probability of 
default (ex post), 
estimated from a 





GDP growth, inflation, interest rate  Negative reaction of risk. Distress 
responses are larger in absolute terms for 
small (cooperative) banks and for banks 
which are not highly capitalized. 
De Nicolò et 
al. (2010) 









spread over the 











Real Federal Funds rate, real GDP 
growth, dummy for low capitalization 
of the banking system 
 
 
Real Federal Funds rate, real GDP 
growth, leverage ratio, dummy for low 
capitalization of the bank 
Positive reaction of risk rating and 
spread. If the banking sector is 
characterized by low capitalization, the 
spread declines. 
 
Increase in risk-weighted assets which is 
larger in absolute terms if the bank is 






U.S. time series 
evidence 
Credit spreads, 
including the spread 
of the C&I loan rate 
over the 2-year T-
Bill rate 
FAVAR  Identification of monetary policy 
shocks based on sign and 
contemporaneous zero restrictions on 
impulse responses. Model controls for 
GDP, the GDP deflator and other 
financial factors. 




Individual bank data 
from the public credit 
registry of Bolivia and 
bank balance sheet 
and income statements 
Probability of default 
on individual (new) 
bank loans estimated 






U.S. Federal Funds rate as measure of 
the monetary policy 
Controls are GDP growth, inflation 
and other bank characteristics. 
Positive reaction of probability of default 
on new loans.  Reaction is larger for 
more liquid banks and less funds from 
foreign financial institutions. Negative 
reaction of probability of default on 
outstanding loans and of  loan spread.  
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Paper  Data  Measure of bank risk  Method Macroeconomic  explanatory 
variables and controls 




Confidential data from the 
Spanish Credit Register 
(individual loans at the bank-
borrower level) on 
outstanding loans and loan 
applications 
Firms’ credit risk: (i) ex ante 
bad credit history, and (ii) 






Controls are GDP growth, 
inflation and individual 
banks’ characteristics 
Intensive margin (outstanding 
loans) and extensive margin (new 
loans): weakly capitalized banks 
expand credit to riskier firms 





Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending (U.S.) 
Loan quality defined as 
percentage of loans made at or 
below the prime rate plus 1%. 
Risk is inversely related to 
loan quality. 
VAR  Identification of shocks to 
the Federal Funds rate and 
GDP 




Senior Loan Officer Survey 
(SLO) (U.S.) 
Lending standards as reported 




VAR GDP,  prices,  commodity 
prices , Federal Funds rate, 
commercial loans  
 
No change in standards, lenders 
change loan rates broadly with the 
Federal Funds rate 






Bank Lending Survey (BLS) 
(Euro Area) 
Senior Loan Officer Survey 
(SLO) (U.S.) 
Lending standards that apply 
to firms and households 
Panel 
regressions 
Taylor rule residuals as a 
proxy of monetary policy 
Controls are long-term 
interest rates, GDP growth, 
inflation, securitization, 
supervision standards for 
bank capital. 
Softening of lending standards for 
households and firms 
Degree of securitization and weak 
supervision for bank capital 
strengthens the effect. 
Maddaloni et 
al. (2009) 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) 
(Euro Area) 
Lending standards and 
conditions in terms of changes 
in spreads on average loans, 
collateral requirements, 







Controls are GDP growth, 
inflation, country risk, and 
characteristics of the banking 
sector 
Weaker lending standards for 
average and for riskier loans 
Stronger absolute impact in case 
of securitization. 
Larger banks tend to react less in 
absolute terms.   33
Table 2: The Link Between Lower Policy Rates and Bank Behaviour in Dell’Arricia et al. (2010) 
Model version  Interest rates  Monitoring  Lending  Leverage 
Baseline model  
(exogenous 
leverage) 
Loan rates and deposit rates decrease  Low capitalization: monitoring increases, risk 
decreases 





Lending rates decrease  Monitoring decreases (risk increases)  Increase  Increases 
Perfect competition  Lending rates decrease more the more competitive the market 
Margins are less sensitive to policy rates in more competitive 
markets 
Monitoring decreases (risk increases) 
 
Increase Increases 
Monopoly power    Monitoring increases (risk falls)     
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All Loans  Minimal 




Loan Growth         
  All Banks  All factors  0.57 0.32 0.35 0.44 0.32 
  Observed factors  0.04 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.04 
  Large Banks  All factors  0.66 0.33 0.52 0.53 0.27 
  Observed factors  0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 
  Small Banks  All factors  0.24 0.12 0.19 0.33 0.14 
  Observed factors  0.06 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.10 
  Foreign Banks  All factors  0.64 0.11 0.12 0.54 0.24 
  Observed factors  0.02 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.05 
Loan Rates         
  All Banks  All factors  0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 
  Observed factors  0.71 0.72 0.67 0.74 0.66 
  Large Banks  All factors  0.97 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.96 
  Observed factors  0.71 0.72 0.66 0.73 0.69 
  Small Banks  All factors  0.95 0.83 0.83 0.94 0.96 
  Observed factors  0.73 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.74 
  Foreign Banks  All factors  0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.93 
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Table 4: Difference Between Impulse Responses of Loans and Loan Spreads After 
Monetary Policy and Commercial Property Price Shocks 
The table displays differences in impulse responses after expansionary monetary policy shocks and an 
unexpected increase in commercial property prices. Entries in bold indicate that the differences are 
significant at the 90% level. 
(a) Differences Between Acceptable and Minimum Risk Categories 
  All Banks  Small Banks  Large Banks  Foreign Banks 
Loans        
  Monetary policy shock        
     Impact effect  -0.006 0.006  0.000  -0.003 
     Four quarters  -0.038  0.019 -0.012  -0.026 
  Property price shock        
     Impact effect  0.010  0.104  0.018  -0.014 
     Four quarters  0.026  0.067  -0.006 -0.014 
Loan spreads        
  Monetary policy shock        
     Impact effect  -0.003 -0.014  0.011  -0.005 
     Four quarters  0.005  -0.001  0.005  0.005 
  Property price shock        
     Impact effect  -0.032  -0.108  -0.062  -0.028 
     Four quarters  0.010  0.012 0.002  0.013 
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(b) Differences Across Banking Groups 
  Minimum Risk  Low Risk  Moderate Risk  Acceptable Risk
Loans  
  Monetary policy shock   
 Impact  effect 
     Small – Large  -0.003  0.004 0.004  0.003 
     Small – Foreign  -0.001  0.006 0.000  0.009 
     Large – Foreign  0.002  0.002  -0.004 0.005 
 Four  quarters 
     Small – Large  -0.016  0.011  0.008  0.017 
     Small – Foreign  0.006  0.027  -0.005  0.051 
     Large – Foreign  0.020  0.015  -0.013 0.033 
  Property price shock   
 Impact  effect 
     Small – Large  -0.079  -0.073 -0.038  0.006 
     Small – Foreign  -0.099  -0.154  0.003  0.018 
     Large – Foreign  -0.019  -0.084  0.041 0.013 
 Four  quarters 
     Small – Large  -0.072  -0.071 -0.058  0.000 
     Small – Foreign  -0.087  -0.134  -0.029 -0.008 
     Large – Foreign  -0.017  -0.064  0.029  -0.008 
Loan spreads   
  Monetary policy shock   
 Impact  effect 
     Small – Large  0.024  0.028 0.014  0.000 
     Small – Foreign  0.020  0.025 0.031  0.011 
     Large – Foreign  -0.004  -0.004  0.016 0.012 
 Four  quarters 
     Small – Large  0.015  0.032  0.013  -0.031 
     Small – Foreign  0.069  -0.001  0.033  -0.012 
     Large – Foreign  0.054  -0.032  0.020  0.020 
  Property price shock   
 Impact  effect 
     Small – Large  0.000  -0.005  -0.003  -0.006 
     Small – Foreign  -0.002  -0.004  0.003 -0.008 
     Large – Foreign  -0.002  0.000  0.006  -0.002 
 Four  quarters 
     Small – Large  -0.008  -0.019  -0.002  0.001 
     Small – Foreign  -0.008  -0.010  -0.013 -0.009 




 Figure 1: Macroeconomic Variables, Risk-Weighted Loans, and Latent “Banking” 
Factors 
The solid (dotted) lines in panel b refer to the risk-weighted (unweighted) loan and spread measures.  
 
(a) Macroeconomic Variables 
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(b) Loan Growth and Loan Spreads (Risk-Weighted and Unweighted) 
 

















   38
(c) Latent “Banking” Factors 





























 Figure 2: Effect of Monetary Policy and Commercial Property Price Shocks – VAR 
Analysis 
This figure shows median impulse responses (black solid lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded 
area) and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock (panel (a)) 
and a one standard deviation property price shock (panel (b)) estimated from a VAR which includes the growth of risk-
weighted loans and risk-weighted loan spreads. The black dotted-dashed lines are 68% confidence bands of impulse 
responses obtained from a VAR which includes the growth of unweighted loans and unweighted loan spreads.  
 
(a) Monetary Policy Shock 
 
(b) Property Price Shock   40
Figure 3: Effect of Monetary Policy and Commercial Property Price Shocks on 
Macroeconomic Variables – FAVAR Analysis 
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area) 
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock (panel (a)) and a 
one standard deviation property price shock (panel (b)). 
(a) Monetary Policy Shock 
 
(b) Property Price Shock 
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Figure 4: Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on New Lending and Loan Spreads  
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area) 
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan rates (panel (b)) to a one 
standard deviation monetary policy shock. 
(a) Reaction of New Loans 
 
(b) Reaction of Loan Spreads 
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Figure 5: Effect of Commercial Property Price Shocks on New Lending and Loan 
Spreads  
This figure shows median impulse responses (black lines) together with 68% confidence bands (dark blue shaded area) 
and 90% confidence bands (light blue shaded area) of new lending (panel (a)) and loan rates (panel (b)) to a one 
standard deviation property price shock. 
(a) Reaction of New Loans 
 
(b) Reaction of Loan Spreads 
 